The Durability of Public Goods Changes the Dynamics and Nature of Social Dilemmas
Author Information
Author(s): Sam P. Brown, François Taddei
Primary Institution: Section of Integrative Biology, University of Texas at Austin
Hypothesis
What are the consequences of relaxing the assumption that the benefits of cooperation depend solely on the current frequency of cooperators?
Conclusion
Durable public goods can lead to novel dynamics in social dilemmas, affecting cooperation and defection outcomes.
Supporting Evidence
- Durable public goods can cause transient increases in cooperation in Prisoner's Dilemmas.
- Changes in durability can transform one game into another, affecting cooperation thresholds.
- Groups of cooperators can perform worse than defectors if they inherit fewer public goods.
Takeaway
This study shows that when public goods last a long time, they change how cooperation works, sometimes making it harder for cooperators to succeed.
Methodology
The study uses mathematical modeling to analyze the dynamics of cooperation and defection in social dilemmas involving durable public goods.
Limitations
The model may not account for all complexities of real-world social dilemmas, such as population structure and external perturbations.
Digital Object Identifier (DOI)
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